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Can the rising pension burden in Europe be 
mitigated by immigration? Modelling the 
effects of selected demographic and socio-





Demographic change, and more specifically ageing—defined here as the increase 
in the numbers of retired people—is one of the main challenges which European 
societies must face. Although this challenge cannot be reduced to the 
demographic factor alone, the construction of highly sophisticated models to 
analyse the social and economic impact of ageing introduces problems of data 
availability and comparability between EU Member States. The approach used in 
this paper to overcome these obstacles is different. A demography-based model 
(inspired by Gérard Calot’s previous work) which uses some simplified 
assumptions, has been defined to assess the implications of ageing for the 27 EU 
countries over the period 2008-2050, and the relative impact of a series of 
alternative measures which could be implemented to counteract ageing. Though 
the analysis will focus on labour supply growth through foreign (extra-EU) 
immigration, other actions like the increase of the average effective age at which 
the labour market is left or employment rate growth will also be taken into 
account. Results show that immigration by itself cannot counteract ageing in the 
European Union as the number of immigrants needed to compensate for the 
increasing number of retired people would be so high that no country could 
assume the social and political costs of such a process. However, it can play a 
complementary role if it is combined with other measures contributing to both 
increase labour participation and delay retirement. This policy mix should be 
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different in each EU Member State depending on the initial specific situation of 
each parameter of the model. 
 
 
1  Introduction: The need for a simplified model to ensure 
sufficient comparability between countries 
Demographic projections indicate that European population ageing will become 
more pronounced over the next decades. This demographic trend will have 
economic and social consequences in a number of areas with important policy 
implications (European Commission 2009; OECD 2007a). For instance, 
population ageing has raised a lot of interest among policymakers working in the 
field of pensions, and particularly in relation to the future sustainability of pension 
systems across the European Union and other developed countries (OECD 
2009b). As most of the European public pension schemes are pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) systems where today’s workers pay the pension of today’s retired people 
(Whitehouse 2007; OECD 2007b, 2009a), the future decrease in the working age 
population and increasing numbers of retired people are supposed to threaten the 
equilibrium of pension systems. Concerns over the increasing costs of health 
systems and the future productivity of the European economy have also been 
expressed. 
An important indicator of the ageing process, particularly related to the 
sustainability of pension systems, is the ratio of the number of retired to the 
number of employed people. This is often referred to as the economic dependency 
ratio (EDR). At the European Union level, the pressure on the economic 
dependency ratio will increase after 2010 as the baby boom generation will start 
entering the retirement age. Consequently, the EDR will probably keep increasing 
until about 2040, all other factors being constant. The pressure of the baby boom 
effect on the dependency ratio will then start decreasing. Only an important 
growth of the working age population due to an increase in fertility levels or, 
more likely, a continuous inflow of (young) immigrants could help compensate 
for the tendency to ageing. 
However, the analysis of the economic implications of ageing (e.g. on the 
financial sustainability of pension systems) cannot only be limited to the effect of 
demographic factors. It also needs to take into account other factors that play a 
major role in funding pensions, such as the employment level, the economic 
performance in terms of productivity (GDP per employed person), and the main 
characteristics of the pension systems in relation to the level of contributions and 
the relative level of pensions. 
A considerable amount of research has already been devoted to examine the 
economic consequences of ageing (see for instance: Lee et al. 2001; Lesthaeghe 
2002; Mason 2005); including its impact on the labour market (Coleman 1992, 
2004; Feld 2000; Fotakis and Gil Alonso 2002; Bijak et al. 2007), human capital Fernando Gil Alonso  125 
and productivity (Skirbekk 2004; Lutz et al. 2004; OECD 2006; Prskawetz 2005; 
Prskawetz et al. 2008), health/disability (Lutz and Scherbov 2005), care of older 
people (Murphy et al. 2006; Gaymu et al. 2007), and the sustainability of pension 
systems (Franco and Munzi 1996; Fotakis 2000; European Commission 2006; 
OECD 2007b and 2009b). In the majority of the European Union Member States, 
there already are many sophisticated models for forecasting pensions which take 
due account of the specificities of national pension systems. Nevertheless, it is 
very difficult to draw comparisons between countries due to the differences in the 
models used, particularly in terms of their structures and basic assumptions and of 
course the different types of pension systems that exist across EU countries. 
Several attempts have also been made in the past, based on the analytical models 
and projections used in several countries (see for instance Franco and Munzi 
1996; European Commission 1997), to provide a common framework at European 
level. However, their complexity and lack of comparability among countries limit 
the use of their results. 
A suggestive way to overcome this obstacle, used in this paper, is by defining 
a model that uses simplified assumptions. It does not intend to give precise 
pension expenditure forecasts, but rather assesses the demographic effect of 
ageing on the balance between contributions and benefits, keeping all other 
factors unchanged. At the same time, the model sheds light on the implications of 
a range of economic and demographic measures—increasing international 
immigration among them—that could be used to reduce the ageing burden. 
 
 
2  Presentation of the broad framework of the model 
The model presented in this paper improves, updates (using the new 2008-based 
‘convergence’ scenario of the Eurostat population projections) and extends up to 
2050 and for the current 27 Member States the old one developed for the 
European Commission in the internal working paper “Pension Sustainability, 
Ageing and Labour Supply”
1 (Gil Alonso and Math 2000). That model was 
applied to the then 15 Member States and was developed, at a macro-economic 
level, on the basis of the previous one proposed by Calot et al. (1995). A later 
unpublished version of the model presented at the IUSSP International Population 
Conference 2005 in Tours was enlarged to include 25 EU countries (Gil Alonso 
2005). All these models integrate the necessary key elements to assess pension 
funding sustainability and are based on the same principle: a PAYG system is in 
an equilibrium situation when there is a balance between the total contributions to 
pensions and the total benefits received by retired people. If the number of 
retirees increases due to ageing, the volume of pensions will increase and the 
system will be put into difficulties unless the other variables of the model change 
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to recover the initial financial equilibrium. These variables are: the number of 
(indigenous or immigrant) people in employment, the average exit age from the 
labour market, the so-called ‘transfer ratio’ and the proportion of GDP spent on 
pensions. It is a somewhat more complex model than the purely demographic one 
proposed by United Nations (2001) in its famous publication on ‘replacement 
migrations’,
2 where the only variable compensating a declining and ageing 
population was an increase in the number of immigrants.
3 
The present model uses Eurostat demographic projections (convergence 
scenario) for the period 2008-2050 to foresee the future evolution of retired 
people. This is the model’s initial input. The implications of ageing on the balance 
between contributions and benefits (keeping all other factors unchanged) are 
examined, as well as the change(s) required in other key parameters of the model 
to ensure equilibrium between the total contributions to pensions and the total 
benefits received during the analysed period. In this way, the model provides an 
insight on how the implications of ageing may be mitigated when examining 
possible evolutions of other key factors such as: increasing the effective 
retirement age (which primarily leads to a lower number of retirees and therefore 
to less pension expenditure, and may secondarily increase the number of 
employed people and consequently the total contributions); decreasing the 
pension levels (and thus the expenditure); increasing the number of people in 
work—either through immigration or growing employment rates—and their 
productivity (which both imply an increase in the total contributions); and finally 
increasing their average contributions to the pension system. These alternative 
compensatory measures are the outputs of the model. Among these, the number of 
employed immigrants required to enter after 2008 (plus their employed children 
born since) to compensate for the increasing size of the retired population will be 
emphasised in this paper. 
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3  Formal description of the model  
At the macroeconomic level, the funding of pensions is a question of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) redistribution from those who are participating in 
economic life to those who are already retired. A pension system can be described 
as in equilibrium when the volume of contributions levied on workers equals the 
amount of pensions paid to retired people. 
 
Volume of contributions = volume of pensions  (1)
or 
GDP · c = R · p  (2)
where  
•  GDP = the wealth produced (gross domestic product) 
•  c = the share of gross domestic product necessary to finance pensions, 
comprising all forms of contribution to the system, i.e. employers and employees 
contributions, taxes and other contributions
4 
•  R = the number of retired people 
•  p = the average pension 
(2) is equivalent to:  
E · GDP/E · c = R · t · GDP/E  (3)
where: 
•  E = the number of people in employment (in full-time equivalents), i.e. 
the people producing the GDP from which the pensions are financed 
•  GDP/E = the average gross domestic product per employed person 
(GDP divided by the number of people working) 
•  t = the ‘transfer ratio’, defined here as the ratio of average pension to 
average gross domestic product per employed person (t = p / (GDP/E)) 
(3) can be simplified further and then is equivalent to:  
E · c = R · t  (4)
As the number of retired people (R), the number of employed people (E) and 
the weight of contributions in percentage of GDP (c) is known for any particular 
year, t can be estimated for 2008 (initial year of the projection model) by 
assuming the equilibrium between expenditure and receipts. 
t =E / R  ·  c   ( 5 )
In this model, pension sustainability is achieved when total resources equal 
total expenditure at the macroeconomic level during the considered period (in this 
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case, 2008-2050). Within this framework, it is not relevant whether pension 




4  Assumptions for the variables and parameters used in 
the model 
The model works under the basis of the following assumptions: 
•  Pension schemes are assumed to be in financial equilibrium in the starting 
year (2008). Therefore, all findings should be related to this year as the reference 
point. 
•  The only external shock unbalancing the system is assumed to be the 
change in the number of retired people (defined as the number of persons aged 
over the average labour market exit age in each country) due to population 
ageing. 
•  Data on population by age for the period 2008-2050 are taken from 
Eurostat demographic scenarios (convergence scenario). The methodology of this 
projection is based on the assumption that the socio-economic and cultural 
differences between the Member States of the European Union (EU) will fade out 
in the very long run (in this case, by the year 2150). If these narrowing differences 
concern the demographic drivers, then the assumption implies that demographic 
values are convergent. Two different convergence scenarios have been developed 
by Eurostat: with migration and without migration from 2009 onwards (therefore 
population growth and structure is only determined by births and deaths). The 
latter has been preferably used here, as the number of (employed) immigrants 
(and their descendants) compensating ageing is one of the main outputs of the 
model. However, the more realistic scenario with migration has also been used to 
compare results and to assess the compensatory effect of migration levels forecast 
by Eurostat. 
•  E, the number of people employed and therefore contributing to the 
system, is calculated by using the full-time equivalents (FTE). They have been 
calculated for each country by multiplying the number of people working part-
time times the ratio of the average number of usual weekly hours of work of those 
working part-time to the average number of usual weekly working hours of full-
time employees. This ratio is around 0.5, but significant variations exist among 
countries. The resulting figures, plus the number of people currently working full-
time, give us the total number of full-time equivalent employees. Taking the FTE 
rate provides a better and more comparable insight, between countries and over 
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time, of the ability of employed people to create wealth and to contribute to 
pension systems funding.
6 
•  c, the share of GDP levied to finance pensions, is estimated from the total 
expenditure on old age and survivors' benefits, as given by Eurostat ESSPROS 
database.
7 
•  R, the retired population, is assumed to be the part of the population 
above the average effective retirement age (ERA, as defined by Eurostat: average 
exit age from the labour market, weighted by the probability of withdrawal from 
the labour market). This assumption is acceptable as most older people actually 
have direct or derivative rights to pensions. The average effective retirement age 
has been estimated for each country by Eurostat (see the indicator called “average 
exit age from the labour force, weighted by the probability of withdrawal from the 
labour market”) from EU Labour Force Survey data on age-specific activity rates. 
•  t, the transfer ratio, is equal to E/R . c when the system is in equilibrium 
(see Equation  5) and provides a proxy measure to assess the evolution of the 
relative pension level. It is similar to the ‘net replacement rate’ used in other 
models, which is the ratio of the average pension to the average wage. However, 
‘t’ puts in relation the average pension to the average GDP per employed person, 
which is a direct measure of productivity—indeed, ‘t’ can decrease because the 
average pension diminishes or because productivity increases. Therefore, 
maintaining the relative level of average pension implies that the absolute level of 
the average pension should evolve at the same pace as productivity. 
•  As the model assumes that GDP is entirely produced by employed people 
and pensions are distributed among the retired population (as defined in R), it 
disregards people who are neither employed nor retired. It is hence assumed that 
those people are neither contributing nor costing anything to GDP, although some 
of them may benefit from different forms of government transfers—and 
unemployed people impose opportunity costs, by reducing contributions to the 
pension system. This assumption of this simplified model is obviously fully 
justified as the paper’s main interests are the consequences of ageing on old age 
(retirement and survivors) pensions. A more complex model could incorporate the 
impact of other forms of government transfers and social policies—e.g. health 
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care contributions and expenditure, which are distributed across ages in a similar 
way as pensions, or unemployment benefits. 
The values of the parameters of the model in 2008 (or more recent available 
data) for the 27 Member States, as well as for EU-15 and EU-25, can be seen in 
Table  1. This table also shows the figures for related indicators such as the 
economic dependency ratio, the full-time equivalent employment rate and the 
average effective retirement age—which is significantly lower than the ‘legal’ 
retirement age in most countries. Table 1 shows a wide range of 2008 ‘starting’ 
positions in the different parameters:  
•  Parameter ‘c’, which has remained quite stable in the EU at around 12% 
in the last years, varies widely between countries, from just 4.6% in Ireland and 
around 5.7% in the Baltic countries to 13.5% in Belgium and 15.5% in Italy. 
•  The transfer ratio is significantly below the European average in 
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, and relatively high in Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Cyprus and Austria. 
•  The lowest economic dependency ratio can be found in Ireland (27.1%) 
and the highest in Italy (69.7%), well above the EU-27 average (52.4%). 
•  Full-time equivalent employment rates vary between the minimum values 
found in Malta (51.6%) and Poland (53.6%) and the highest ones in Latvia 
(69.2%), Estonia (69.1%), Denmark (68.1%) and Sweden (68%)—EU average 
around 61%.  
•  Finally, in Romania, Bulgaria and Ireland the average effective retirement 
age is already above 64 years (followed by Sweden and the Netherlands at 63.9), 
whereas in Malta and Slovakia it is just below 59, followed by France and 
Luxembourg. 
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Table 1: 
Main parameters of the model in 2008 (or more recent available data) in the EU 











Belgium 2,217  3,959 13.5 0.24 56.0 56.2 61.6 7,039 
Bulgaria  1,409  3,222  7.7 0.18 43.7 60.9 64.1  5,295 
Czech  Republic  2,104  4,799  7.8 0.18 43.8 65.2 60.7  7,355 
Denmark  1,182  2,461  10.7 0.22 48.1 68.1 60.6  3,613 
Germany  19,034  32,493  12.2 0.21 58.6 59.7 62.0  54,415 
Estonia  262  629  5.6 0.13 41.6 69.1 62.5  910 
Greece  2,596  4,368  12.1 0.20 59.4 58.0 61.0  7,525 
Spain  8,865  19,045  8.4 0.18 46.5 61.2 62.1  31,143 
France  14,001  23,733  12.9 0.22 59.0 58.9 59.4  40,324 
Ireland  529  1,955  4.6 0.17 27.1 64.7 64.1  3,026 
Italy  15,101  21,674  15.5 0.22 69.7 55.2 60.4  39,230 
Cyprus  110  362  8.3 0.27 30.3 65.1 63.5  557 
Latvia  430  1,083  5.7 0.14 39.7 69.2 63.3  1,566 
Lithuania  695  1,476  5.7 0.12 47.1 63.7 59.9  2,316 
Luxembourg  95  187  7.3 0.14 50.6 57.3 59.4  326 
Hungary  2,223  3,858  9.2 0.16 57.6 55.8 59.8  6,913 
Malta  93  148  9.4 0.15 63.0 51.6 58.5  287 
Netherlands  2,634  6,361  11.4 0.27 41.4 57.5 63.9  11,055 
Austria  1,791  3,528  13.4 0.26 50.8 62.7 60.9  5,628 
Poland  7,256  14,526  11.5 0.23 49.9 53.6 59.3  27,083 
Portugal  2,129  4,780  11.7 0.26 44.5 67.0 62.6  7,139 
Romania  3,333  9,013  6.2 0.17 37.0 60.2 64.3  14,969 
Slovenia  433  931  10.1 0.22 46.5 65.7 59.8  1,416 
Slovakia  995  2,328  6.9 0.16 42.8 59.7 58.7  3,901 
Finland  1,113  2,313  9.6 0.20 48.1 65.5 61.6  3,530 
Sweden  1,745  4,104  12.1 0.28 42.5 68.0 63.9  6,033 
United  Kingdom  11,579  24,958  11.6 0.25 46.4 61.4 62.6  40,660 
EU 27  103,952  198,292 11.9 0.23 52.4 59.5 61.2 333,248 
EU  25  99,211  186,057  12.0 0.22 53.3 59.4 61.2  312,985 
EU  15  84,611  155,917  12.2 0.22 54.3 59.8 61.5  261 
 
Definitions and sources of data: 
R  Retired persons (people over average effective retirement age). Source: calculated by the author from 
Eurostat data (2007). 
E  Employed people in full-time equivalents. Source: calculated by the author from Eurostat Labour Force 
Survey data (2007). 
c(%)  Public expenditure (% of GDP) in old age and survivors pensions. Source: Eurostat ESSPROS database, 
2006 data. 
t  Transfer ratio calculated as in formula (5) in order to ensure equality in equation (1). 
EDR  Economic Dependency Ratio (number of retired persons by 100 employed people).  
ER  Employment rate (employed persons by 100 working age population) in full-time equivalents. 
ERA  Average Effective Retirement Age. Source: Eurostat 2007 data on average exit age from the labour 
market. 
wap  Working age population (persons aged 15-64 years old). Source: 2008-based Eurostat demographic 
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5  Different measures to compensate for the impact of 
ageing 
In a first step, the model examines the impact of ageing, and more specifically the 
growth of the number of retired people, on the equilibrium between the two sides 
of the model between 2000 and 2050, all other key factors remaining constant. 
The exact number of retired people, R’, is determined by the value of the effective 
retirement age (ERA, which in this first step is kept constant between 2008 and 
2050) and the variation of the age structure determined by the Eurostat 
convergence scenario. The model’s outputs show the magnitude of the changes 
needed in the different parameters in order to maintain the model in equilibrium 
and thereby counteract the effect of ageing. These compensatory changes are 
examined one by one (approach ceteris paribus) to assess the individual 
compensatory effect in ageing that each key factor could have. In this paper, the 
measure of increasing the number of employed persons (E’) through immigration 
(Imm’) to compensate for the growth of retired people, will be examined in more 
detail (Section  6.1). Subsequently, other alternative measures will be analysed 
more briefly (Section 6.2), for instance: 
•  Increasing the number of employed persons (E’) by raising the 
employment rates (ER’) of the indigenous population (without immigration); 
•  Increasing the effective retirement age (ERA’): this results in a decrease 
in the number of retired people (R) and an increase in the number of potential 
contributors; 
•  Increasing the share of GDP to finance pensions (c’), by increasing social 
contributions and/or taxes; 
•  Decreasing the transfer ratio (t’), by making the average pension increase 
by a smaller percentage than the GDP per employed person (productivity).  
In a second step (Section 6.3), different future values of the key factors are 
also introduced in the model as inputs, resulting in different prospective scenarios 
due to the combination of changes in the parameters. Finally, Section  6.4 
examines how these parameters vary between EU countries, as they reflect, to 
some extent, the margins of manoeuvre and flexibility that each country has in 
addressing the impact of ageing. 
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6  Results 
6.1  Is it possible to counteract ageing through immigration 
alone? 
 
Let us suppose that the EU-27 population is closed to migration, as in the zero-
migration Eurostat convergence scenario, and that the effective retirement age is 
fixed in its 2008 value. Then, on top of mortality, the number of retired people 
between 2008 and 2050 will only be determined by the age structure ageing 
process. Table 2 shows the number of retired people in 2050 (R’) under these 
conditions and some of the compensatory changes needed in the key factors to 
counteract the increase in the number of retired people and maintain the model in 
equilibrium. 
Under the assumptions of a constant effective retirement age of 61.2 years, the 
number of retired people in the whole European Union will pass from 103.9 
million in 2004 (Table 1) to 163.8 million in 2050 (Table 2, first column). If the 
number of employed people does not change (as do parameters t and c, approach 
ceteris paribus), then the Economic Dependency Ratio in 2050 (EDR’) will suffer 
a dramatic increase: from 52.4 retired people per 100 employed in 2008, it will 
grow by 30 percentage points to 82.6% in 2050, with national values ranging 
from 54.7% in Latvia to 101.5% in Malta! 
The most direct measure to keep the model in equilibrium and to fix the 
Economic Dependency Ratio up to 2050 would be to increase the number of 
employed people at the same growth rate as R. The resulting number of 
employees in 2050 is shown in Table 2 as E’. The value for EU-27 is nearly 318 
million employed people in full-time equivalents, compared to 198 million in 
2008. This means an employment increase of around 120 million or, in relative 
figures, a 60% growth from the current value—or, which is the same, an annual 
employment growth rate of 1.13%. In other words, this is somewhat less than the 
average employment growth that was required by the EU between 2000 and 2010 
in order to fulfil the Lisbon employment targets (estimated at around 1.2% p.a.), 
and practically the same growth rate than the one experienced by the EU-27 
during the last decade (1997-2007 data, i.e. in a period of economic expansion), 
except here employment is assumed to keep growing until 2050 (for more than 40 
years). Moreover, the resulting ‘impossible’ employment rate in 2050 
(ER’=131%) means that the regressive evolution of the working age population—
which will pass from 333 million in 2008 to 242 million in 2050—will constitute 
an additional limitation in achieving the required employment level to 
compensate for ageing. 
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Table 2: 
Parameters of the model in 2050 when the increase of employment through 
immigration is the only compensatory action (ceteris paribus approach) 













ER’ (%)  Imm’ 
(thousands) 
Belgium 3,372  85.2  6,022  1.00  5,665  106.3  1,773 
Bulgaria 1,958  60.8  4,477  0.79  3,247  137.9  2,042 
Czech Republic  3,451  71.9  7,872  1.19  4,642  169.6  4,390 
Denmark 1,702  69.2  3,541  0.87  3,082  114.9  1,230 
Germany 26,000  80.0  44,385  0.75  34,077  130.3  18,828 
Estonia 377  60.0  906  0.87  674  134.3  400 
Greece 3,893  89.1  6,551  0.97  4,855  134.9  2,910 
Spain 16,609  87.2  35,681  1.51  20,206  176.6  20,527 
France 21,922  92.4  37,160  1.07  36,878  100.8  9,502 
Ireland 1,485  76.0  5,488  2.49  2,959  185.5  3,269 
Italy 20,957  96.7  30,079  0.78  24,575  122.4  11,648 
Cyprus 269  74.2  887  2.15  448  198.0  551 
Latvia 593  54.7  1,495  0.77  1,038  144.0  716 
Lithuania 1,044  70.8  2,218  0.98  1,637  135.5  991 
Luxembourg 174  93.1  344  1.46  258  133.1  150 
Hungary 3,144  81.5  5,457  0.83  4,545  120.1  2,048 
Malta 150  101.5  239  1.14  2045  116.6  85 
Netherlands 4,844  76.1  11,698  1.46  8,935  130.9  4,997 
Austria 2,894  82.0  5,701  1.15  3,853  147.9  2,811 
Poland 13,541  93.2  27,110  1.50  18,523  146.4  13,218 
Portugal 3,452  72.2  7,752  1.16  4,768  162.6  4,176 
Romania 5,828  64.7  15,759  1.34  10,139  155.4  8,154 
Slovenia 722  77.6  1,552  1.23  869  178.7  901 
Slovakia 1,970  84.6  4,608  1.64  2,631  175.1  2,634 
Finland 1,616  69.9  3,358  0.89  2,883  116.5  1,195 
Sweden 2,651  64.6  6,234  1.00  5,149  121.1  2,372 
United Kingdom  19,177  76.8  41,333  1.21  35,199  117.4  14,934 
EU 27  163,796  82.6  317,908  1.13  241,941  131.4  136,452 
EU 25  156,011  83.9  297,671  1.13  228,554  130.2  126,256 
EU 15  130,748  83.9  245,328  1.09  193,342  126.9  100,321 
Definitions: 
R  Retired persons (people over average effective retirement age) in 2050 determined by Eurostat no-
migration convergence scenario. 
EDR  Economic Dependency Ratio (number of retired persons by 100 employed people) in 2050 if total 
employment (in full-time equivalents) does not change. 
E’  Employed people in full-time equivalents maintaining the model in equilibrium in 2050. 
Eg’  Annual employment growth (in %) between 2008 and 2050 maintaining the model in equilibrium. 
wap  Working age population (persons aged 15-64 years old) in 2050 determined by Eurostat no-migration 
convergence scenario. 
ER’  Employment rate (employed persons / working age population) in full-time equivalents maintaining the 
model in equilibrium in 2050. 
Imm’  Number of (employed) immigrants and their descendants maintaining the model in equilibrium in 2050. Fernando Gil Alonso  135 
Figure  1 illustrates these numbers, showing the change in the number of 
retired people determined by the Eurostat no-migration convergence scenario (R) 
and the number of employed persons maintaining the model in equilibrium (E’) 
for the EU-27 between 2008-2050. These growing numbers are compared with 
the decreasing size of the working age population (wap). If we consider that an 
employment rate of 75% (in full-time equivalents) is a plausible ceiling of 
employability in the European Union—this is even higher that the level presently 
existing in the EU country with the highest employment rate, Latvia, at 69.2%—
then there will be a deficit in workforce numbers from the year 2020 onwards.  
The magnitude of the employment growth required to compensate for ageing 
is so important that the role of international (extra-EU) immigration is 
emphasised. Let us estimate the number of required immigrants (including their 
descendants) as the difference between E’ (total employment in full-time 
equivalents maintaining the system in equilibrium) and a level of 75% of the 
working age population projected by the convergence scenario (Figure 1). The 
workforce deficit will reach its maximum in 2050, when E’ will overpass the 75% 
of the native working age population by more than 136 million employees. In 
other words, this will be the number of additional required workers, i.e. extra-EU 
immigrants (and their descendants) to compensate for  ageing. The model 
obviously assumes all these immigrants and their children to be employed, so the 
real figure of necessary arriving immigrants would in fact be much higher, as the 
current employment rate of immigrants with non-EU citizenship is lower than that 
of EU citizens (European Commission 2009), and the number of immigrants 
outside the working age should also be taken into account. Moreover, arriving 
immigrants will eventually enter retirement as well, resulting in an additional 
increase of E’ to compensate for the growing numbers of R’ and to keep the 
model in equilibrium. 
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Figure 1: 
Changes in the numbers of retired people (R) and working age population (wap) in 
the EU-27 between 2008 and 2050, as well as in the number of employed persons (E’) 



















Source: elaborated using Eurostat no-migration convergence scenario. 
 
 
If we keep the conservative estimation of 136 million employed immigrants 
(including their employed children) by the year 2050, it means an average entry 
of more than 3.2 million net migrants per year. To obtain an idea of the magnitude 
of this inflow, we should bear in mind that the number of immigrants coming to 
the EU between 2002 and 2008 (period of high immigration) has fluctuated 
between 1.6 and 2.0 million per year (Eurostat data, net migration including 
corrections). This result shows that employment growth alone will not be able to 
counteract ageing at EU level, even if complemented with immigration, as both 
the amount of new employment required and the level of immigration needed can 
clearly not be sustained over a period of 42 years. 
Results are even more dramatic if we use the more ‘realistic’ Eurostat 
convergence scenario with migration (Table  3), incorporating a positive net 
migration of 49.4 million immigrants between 2008 and 2050. In such a case, the 
number of retired people grows to almost 172 million, but the working age 
population also reaches 294 million in 2050. Therefore the required number of 
employed immigrants (and their children) to compensate for ageing is ‘only’ 112 
million. However, as said above, this scenario already includes a net migration of 
around 50 million immigrants during the projected period (a 1.2 million average 
per year), so the total number of required employed immigrants and their 
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Table 3: 
Parameters of the model in 2050 when the increase of employment through 
immigration is the only compensatory action (ceteris paribus approach) 














ER’ (%)  Imm’ 
(thousands) 
Belgium  3,621  91.5  6,466  1.17  7,144  90.5  1,108 
Bulgaria  1,935  60.1  4,426  0.76  3,341  132.5  1,921 
Czech Republic  3,663  76.3  8,355  1.33  5,584  149.6  4,167 
Denmark  1,722  70.0  3,582  0.90  3,493  102.6  963 
Germany  27  82.1  45,524  0.81  41,857  108.8  14,131 
Estonia  371  58.9  890  0.83  686  129.7  375 
Greece  4,166  95.4  7,009  1.13  6,335  110.7  2,258 
Spain  19  99.6  40,732  1.83  29,120  139.9  18,892 
France  23  95.2  38,306  1.15  40,737  94.0  7,753 
Ireland  1,618  82.8  5,981  2.70  3,838  155.9  3,103 
Italy  24  107.9  33,572  1.05  33,727  99.5  8,277 
Cyprus  315  87.0  1,040  2.54  772  134.7  461 
Latvia  587  54.1  1,478  0.74  1,042  141.8  697 
Lithuania  1,046  70.9  2,223  0.98  1,589  139.9  1,031 
Luxembourg  203  108.6  401  1.84  424  94.6  83 
Hungary  3,305  85.7  5,736  0.95  5,232  109.6  1,812 
Malta  160  107.8  253  1.28  242  104.6  72 
Netherlands  4,723  74.2  11,406  1.40  9,879  115.5  3,997 
Austria  3,035  86.0  5,979  1.26  5,322  112.4  1,988 
Poland  14  93.2  27,114  1.50  18,900  143.5  12,938 
Portugal  3,789  79.3  8,508  1.38  6,512  130.7  3,624 
Romania  5,830  64.7  15,764  1.34  10,139  155.5  8,160 
Slovenia  745  80.0  1,599  1.30  1,028  155.6  828 
Slovakia  2,023  86.9  4,730  1.70  2,771  170.7  2,652 
Finland  1,679  72.6  3,487  0.98  3,133  111.3  1,137 
Sweden  2,781  67.8  6,540  1.12  6,294  103.9  1,819 
United Kingdom  19  77.2  41,537  1.22  45,047  92.2  7,752 
EU 27  171,744  86.6  332,640  1.24  294,188  113.1  112,00
EU 25  163,979  88.1  312,450  1.24  280,708  111.3  101,91
EU 15  138,223  88.7  259,032  1.22  242,860  106.7  76,888 
Definitions: 
R  Retired persons (people over average effective retirement age) in 2050 determined by Eurostat 
convergence scenario (with migration). 
EDR  Economic Dependency Ratio (number of retired persons by 100 employed people) in 2050 if total 
employment (in full-time equivalents) does not change. 
E'  Employed people in full-time equivalents maintaining the model in equilibrium in 2050. 
Eg’  Annual employment growth (in %) between 2008 and 2050 maintaining the model in equilibrium. 
wap  Working age population (persons aged 15-64 years old) in 2050 determined by Eurostat convergence 
scenario (with migration). 
ER’  Employment rate (employed persons / working age population) in full-time equivalents maintaining the 
model in equilibrium in 2050. 
Imm’  Number of (employed) immigrants and their descendants maintaining the model in equilibrium in 2050.   Can the rising pension burden in Europe be mitigated by immigration?  138 
6.2  Alternative measures to counteract ageing 
 
The Table 4 columns show the alternative compensating changes required in the 
other parameters of Formula (4) to counteract the sole impact of ageing for the 
period ending in 2050, as explained in Section 5 (ceteris paribus approach). We 
have just seen that the first alternative measure—increasing the number of 
employed persons (E’) through an increase in the employment rates (ER’) of the 
indigenous population, without immigration—is not possible given the future 
reduction of the EU working-age population and the high amount of employment 
creation required. Therefore, the results of the other alternative measures to 
compensate for the effects of ageing will be emphasised in this section. 
•  The average effective retirement age, which is estimated at the age of 
61.2 in 2008 at EU-27 level, should increase by more than 10 years until 2050 (to 
reach a level of 71.4 years, see Column ERA’ in Table 4) in order to maintain the 
model in equilibrium—by fixing the number of retired people at nearly 104 
million like in 2008, all other parameters remaining equal. This is, without doubt, 
a very important increase, but not all that different from the observed growth in 
life expectancy since 1960 which developed at a pace of two additional years per 
decade. 
•  The  GDP contribution to pensions (c) should increase from 12% in 
2008 to almost 19% in 2050 (Column c’, Table 4). Therefore, there should be a 
change of +7 percentage points in 42 years (Column cc), amounting to a 58% 
increase across the period studied. This would be a very important growth as the 
current value for Italy, the country with the highest GDP share to pay for 
pensions, is 15.5%. However this result is under the assumption that the EU-27 
GDP will not grow, which is unsustainable in the long term. Therefore, the effort 
needed to finance the future pension burden will realistically be lower than that 
predicted by the model.  
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Table 4: 
Alternative compensatory actions (ceteris paribus approach) to maintain the model in 
equilibrium in 2050 
EUROSTAT NO-MIGRATION CONVERGENCE SCENARIO 
   ERA’  cERA  c’ (%)  cc (%)  t’  ct  cp (%)  cGDP/e 
Belgium  71.2 9.6  20.5 7.0  0.16  0.66  -34.3  52.1 
Bulgaria  70.1 6.0  10.7 3.0  0.13  0.72  -28.0  39.0 
Czech  Republic 71.1 10.4 12.8  5.0 0.11 0.61  -39.0 64.0 
Denmark  69.8 9.2  15.5 4.7  0.16  0.69  -30.5  43.9 
Germany  69.7 7.7  16.7 4.5  0.15  0.73  -26.8  36.6 
Estonia  69.0 6.5 8.1 2.5  0.09  0.69  -30.6  44.0 
Greece  70.8 9.8  18.1 6.0  0.14  0.67  -33.3  50.0 
Spain  74.8 12.7 15.8  7.4 0.10 0.53  -46.6 87.4 
France  70.3 10.9 20.3  7.3 0.14 0.64  -36.1 56.6 
Ireland  78.8 14.7 13.0  8.4 0.06 0.36  -64.4  180.8 
Italy  70.2 9.8  21.5 6.0  0.16  0.72  -27.9  38.8 
Cyprus  77.4 13.9 20.4 12.0 0.11 0.41  -59.1  144.7 
Latvia  68.9 5.6 7.9 2.2  0.10  0.72  -27.5  38.0 
Lithuania  67.8 7.9 8.6 2.9  0.08  0.67  -33.5  50.3 
Luxembourg  73.9 14.5 13.5  6.2 0.08 0.54  -45.7 84.0 
Hungary  67.8 8.0  13.0 3.8  0.11  0.71  -29.3  41.5 
Malta  69.0 10.5 15.2  5.8 0.09 0.62  -37.9 61.1 
Netherlands  76.3 12.4 20.9  9.5 0.15 0.54  -45.6 83.9 
Austria  72.3 11.4 21.7  8.3 0.16 0.62  -38.1 61.6 
Poland  70.9 11.6 21.5 10.0 0.12 0.54  -46.4 86.6 
Portugal  72.7 10.1 19.0  7.3 0.16 0.62  -38.3 62.2 
Romania  73.3 9.0  10.8 4.6  0.10  0.57  -42.8  74.8 
Slovenia  71.3 11.5 16.8  6.7 0.13 0.60  -40.1 66.8 
Slovakia  71.5 12.8 13.7  6.8 0.08 0.51  -49.5 97.9 
Finland  69.9 8.3  13.9 4.3  0.14  0.69  -31.1  45.2 
Sweden  72.8 8.9  18.3 6.3  0.19  0.66  -34.2  51.9 
United  Kingdom  73.0 10.4 19.2  7.6 0.15 0.60  -39.6 65.6 
EU  27  71.4 10.2 18.8  6.9 0.14 0.63  -36.5 57.6 
EU  25  71.5 10.3 18.9  6.9 0.14 0.64  -36.4 57.3 
EU  15  71.8 10.3 18.8  6.6 0.14 0.65  -35.3 54.5 
Definitions: 
ERA’  Average Effective Retirement Age in 2050 maintaining the model in equilibrium. 
cERA  Increase in years in the average Effective Retirement Age between 2004 and 2050 maintaining the model in 
equilibrium. 
C’ (%)  Public expenditure (% of GDP) in old age and survivors pensions in 2050 maintaining the model in 
equilibrium. 
cc (%)  Increase (in % points) in public expenditure in old age and survivors pensions in 2050 maintaining the model 
in equilibrium. 
tÄ  Transfer ratio in 2050 maintaining the model in equilibrium. 
ct  Coefficient multiplying 2008 Transfer ratios maintaining the model in equilibrium in 2050. 
cp  % change in average pension between 2008 and 2050 maintaining the model in equilibrium (if productivity 
remains constant). 
cGDP/e (%)  % change in GDP per employee (productivity) between 2008 and 2050 maintaining the model in 
equilibrium (if average pension remains constant).   Can the rising pension burden in Europe be mitigated by immigration?  140 
•  Finally, the transfer ratio (t) should be multiplied by 0.63 (Coefficient 
ct, Table  4), that is, decreasing the average pension by 37% (Column cp) in 
relation to the GDP per employee. Or in other words, increasing productivity by 
58% in the same period—which means an average growth of 1.1% per year—if 
pensions remain constant (Column cGDP/e). That means making productivity 
grow quicker than absolute pension levels between 2008 and 2050. An annual 
GDP growth of 1.1% is feasible as it has been reached in the past (e.g. it has been 
surpassed every year at EU-27 level during the period 1999-2007). However, it 
should also be kept in mind that the growth needed will probably be even higher 
because pensions are also likely to increase in the future.
8 
These compensatory changes have been estimated using the Eurostat 
no-migration convergence scenario, but results are similar to those obtained when 
using the scenario with migration, which are not presented here.
9 
The changes required to ensure the equilibrium of the model obviously have 
to be seen as extreme values, since the real evolutions are likely to be a mix of 
changes in all the factors. For instance, given the measures already taken in most 
EU countries to limit pension growth which will lead, if unchanged, to a decrease 
in the relative pension levels and an increase in the effective retirement age, a 
future decrease in transfer ratios and a growth of ERA should be taken for 
granted. 
 
6.3  The compensatory impact of changes in key parameters 
In the second phase of the analysis, the parameters of Equation 4 have been first 
modified and then combined, to check the feasibility of the measures 
compensating ageing. Though only the results obtained for whole EU-27 with the 
model using the no-migration scenario are presented, the exercise has been done 
for both Eurostat convergence scenarios and for all the EU countries.  
For instance, increasing the number of people in employment (E) up to a 
realistic annual employment growth of 0.6% during the studied period would 
result in the EDR’ moderately increasing up to 64.5 retired people per 100 
employed persons, although the resulting employment rate, 105%, means that the 
                                                           
8   This is not the place to discuss the future evolution of pensions, however it should be 
mentioned that their future growth could be mitigated at EU level through indexing pensions to 
prices (as it is done, for instance, in Spain) rather than to wages, which is currently the case in 
many other European countries. By doing this, the transfer ratio should decrease (as average 
pension would probably grow less, over the long term, than the GDP per employee) and the 
sustainability of pension systems could be more easily achieved. 
9   Changes required are actually slightly more important, as the number of retired people in the 
scenario with migration is also larger. For instance, the average effective retirement age should 
increase up to 71.8 instead of 71.4 at EU level to maintain the model in equilibrium; public 
expenditure in pension should increase 7.8 % points instead of 6.9; transfer ratio should be 
multiplied times 0.61 instead of times 0.63, etc. But, in my opinion, these tiny differences do 
not justify adding an additional table when the main findings are the same as those obtained 
with the no-migration scenario. Fernando Gil Alonso  141 
number of jobs required to compensate for ageing in 2050 is still larger than the 
projected working-age population. A lower annual employment growth of 0.3% 
would result in a more feasible (but still too high) employment rate of 93% in 
2050, combined with an EDR’ of 73.5 (currently being of 52.4). What the model 
shows is that increasing employment is an important measure to counteract 
ageing, but the size of the potential workforce (the working age population) limits 
the capacity of growth of the number of people in employment. Therefore, it has 
to be combined with additional measures like an increase in the age at which 
people exit the labour market. 
If we consider increasing the effective retirement age (ERA) alone—e.g. 
delaying it from the current 61.2 years to 65 in 2050—R would drop from 164 to 
143 million and the EDR’ would move from its present level of 52.4 retired per 
100 employed, to 72.3. This is still an important level, but much lower than the 
resulting 83.4 if the average exit age remains unchanged. The EDR’ would 
improve much more (57.3%) if the ERA was delayed up to 70 years, with only 
113 million retirees in 2050. However, we must recognise that, even in a context 
of growing life expectancy, such a significant delay in the retirement age is not 
easy to obtain.  
It would seem more realistic to combine different measures in order to 
counteract ageing: for instance, employment growth with a delaying retirement 
age. Indeed, the higher the increase in effective retirement age, the lower the 
employment growth needed to maintain equilibrium. Or the other way around, the 
higher the growth in employment, the lower the increase in effective retirement 
age needed to compensate for ageing. If an average 0.3% employment growth p.a. 
is combined with a delay in the ERA of 5 years, until the age of 66, then R and E 
would result, respectively, in 137 million and 225 million people in 2050, with a 
resulting EDR’ of 61%, which seems a plausible level—EDR is currently even 
higher in Italy and Malta, see Table 1. The resulting employment rate in full-time 
equivalents, 93%, is still too high, but the deficit in workforce numbers can be 
compensated for with a realistic level of immigration: around 1.8 million 
additional immigrants per year between 2004 and 2050, which is a level similar to 
that observed in the EU-27 during the first decade of the 21st century. This level 
of immigration could be reduced even more, down to slightly over 550,000 net 
migrants per year (Figure 2), if the aforementioned measures were combined with 
an increase in the GDP contribution to pensions (c), which would pass from the 
current 12% to 15% in 2050 at EU-27 level (about equal to the current level in 
Italy, 15.5%). Moreover, the required level of immigrants could even be reduced 
to zero if these measures were combined with an additional decrease of 13% in 
the transfer ratio—i.e. through a feasible increase of productivity 
(GDP/employee) of 15% over a period of 42 years (if average pensions remain 
constant) or a reduction of the average pension in 13% if productivity remains 
stable. Or through a more simplistic—but harder to achieve—combination of a 
growth in retirement age up to 66 with an increase in c until 18% (see Figure 3).   Can the rising pension burden in Europe be mitigated by immigration?  142 
Figure 2: 
Parameter changes if employment grows by 0.3% p.a., the ERA increases by 5 years 
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Parameter changes if the effective retirement age increases by 5 years and ‘c’ 
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Source: elaborated using Eurostat no-migration convergence scenario. 
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The model’s results demonstrate that the long-term sustainability of pension 
systems appears to be a challenge which can only be overcome if the European 
Union achieves high, but nonetheless feasible, levels of employment growth over 
the next decades, combined with other complementary measures like increasing 
the average labour market exit age and the GDP share devoted to pensions, and 
reducing the ratio of the average pension to productivity. Immigration will only 
be needed to compensate for ageing if some of these measures are either not 
implemented at all or not effective enough. Indeed, the model’s results highlight 
that immigration alone is not the solution to maintain the model at equilibrium, 
but only a complementary measure. However, owing to differences between the 
ageing process and other relevant factors across EU countries, some 
compensatory measures might be more appropriate for some countries than 
others. 
 
6.4  Considerations at a national level 
 
As the model does not take on board the particular features of each national 
pension system, its outcomes at a national level must be interpreted with more 
caution. These are the main findings: 
•  None of the countries of Europe can expect to escape the ageing 
population trend. The ‘baby boomers’ will reach their retirement age and, despite 
national differences in fertility rates, the younger cohorts entering the labour 
market will be unable to compensate for the high numbers of older people 
entering retirement age. 
•  However, the common trend towards ageing will present important timing 
and intensity differences among EU countries. Table 2 shows the national impact 
of ageing, if all other factors, including current employment rates, remain 
unchanged. Though Ireland and Cyprus—which currently have the youngest 
populations and the lowest economic dependency ratios—will face the highest 
pressure to compensate for the impact of ageing (see Columns Eg and ER’ in 
Table 2), the highest dependency ratios (EDR’) in 2050 will be found in Malta, 
Italy, Poland and France, all of them countries which are currently characterised 
by both relatively low employment rates and retirement ages. By contrast, the 
three Baltic States, the Scandinavian countries, Bulgaria and Romania will be the 
least affected by dependency changes between 2008 and 2050.  
•  Differences in the ageing process between the EU countries will clearly 
condition the appropriate policy options for counteracting it. In addition, there 
already are significant differences in the current levels of various parameters of 
the model (Table 1 shows the actual values for some of the relevant key factors at 
a national level). Therefore, measures to preserve the model’s equilibrium will not 
have the same impact in each European country.  
•  Apart from their potential impact, some measures are difficult to apply in 
some countries, due to the current value of the parameters, but a lot more   Can the rising pension burden in Europe be mitigated by immigration?  144 
appropriate for others (see Table 2). In countries like Romania, Bulgaria, Ireland, 
Sweden and Cyprus, where the effective retirement age (ERA) is already late 
even today, any additional increase in the average effective retirement age could 
be more difficult to implement than in other countries like Malta, Slovakia, 
Luxembourg or France where the exit of the labour market is, on average, at 
much younger ages; hence, other measures may have to be taken in the former 
group of countries. 
•  Similarly, in countries with current high employment rates (ER) like 
Latvia, Estonia, Denmark or Sweden, it seems more difficult to consider job 
creation as the key compensatory measure than in Malta, Poland, Italy, Hungary 
or Belgium with their low employment levels. While a decrease in the transfer 
ratio could have significant stabilising effects in some countries (for instance in 
Sweden, Austria, the UK and Belgium, where the present pension level in relation 
to GDP per employee presents some margins for manoeuvre), the current lower 
share of GDP devoted to pensions in Ireland, the Baltic countries or Romania, 
shows that an increase in ‘c’ is a more plausible measure for these countries to 
maintain equilibrium. 
•  Finally, an additional—and complementary—means to stabilise the 
system may be to increase the number of employed people through immigration, 
particularly in those EU countries like Spain or Italy, where the margins of 




7  Conclusions 
The model shows that the impact of ageing on the sustainability of pension 
systems over the next 42 years is significant at EU level and for the 27 Member 
States. This challenge can be overcome through a combination of different 
policies regarding immigration, employment, retirement age, economic 
productivity and pension levels. A policy framework promoting economic growth 
with increasing productivity and more jobs for both indigenous people and 
immigrants (which will be needed if the European working-age population cannot 
cope with growing employment levels) is therefore required, together with 
policies encouraging people to remain in work longer—and subsequently 
improving older worker employability (OECD 2006). Therefore, early exits from 
the labour market should not continue to be as frequent as they are today. These 
issues have been assumed by European policymakers, and there is presently a 
significant pressure across the European Union to implement policies increasing 
employment and labour market participation levels, encouraging internal 
migration (free movement of workers), and delaying the actual retirement age—
measures which should help financing future pensions. However, a European 
consensus regarding the role international immigration is more difficult to Fernando Gil Alonso  145 
achieve, as this is a very delicate issue in most EU Member States, with a lot of 
social and political implications. The model nevertheless demonstrates that, if the 
entry flow is combined with some of the other policies already mentioned, the 
number of (employed) immigrants—and their descendants—required in the 
European Union to counter the effect of ageing on pensions will be similar to, or 
even lower than, present figures. This policy mix is probably the best way of 
assuming the varying social costs of the different policy options, as policies will 
only require small changes. However, if only one policy option is implemented, 
its social impact could be more difficult to be taken on by stakeholders and the 
population in general. 
The model shows the existence of a wide range of national situations in terms 
of the appropriate policy measures required in each Member State to maintain the 
pension system in equilibrium. This is both due to differences in the timing and 
intensity of the ageing process and to the diverse initial levels of the main factors 
affecting pension sustainability across EU countries: effective retirement age, 
employment rates, relative pension level, and GDP share devoted to finance 
pensions. 
Therefore the pension challenge is different for each European country. Those 
with a high average effective retirement age and high employment rates may need 
to adjust the GDP contribution and pension levels in order to compensate for the 
ageing impact. Their margins of manoeuvre appear somewhat smaller than in 
other countries with lower labour market participation and earlier exit from 
working activity: these appear to have more scope for adjustments by increasing 
the average effective retirement age and the employment rates. Finally, 
immigration seems a complementary resource when all the other compensatory 
measures are difficult to implement or of insufficient effectiveness due to the 
magnitude of ageing. Nevertheless, immigration by itself cannot counteract 
ageing in the European Union as the number of immigrants needed to compensate 
for the increasing number of retired people would be so high that no country 
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